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Abstract 
Pushed by recent legislation and smart disclosure initiatives, Personal Information 
Management Systems (PIMS) emerge and hold the promise of giving the control back to the 
individual on her data. However, this shift leaves the privacy and security issues in user's 
hands, a role that few people can properly endorse. Indeed, existing sharing models are 
difficult to administrate and securing their implementation in user's computing environment is 
an unresolved challenge. This paper advocates the definition of a Privacy-by-Design sharing 
paradigm, called SWYSWYK (Share What You See with Who You Know), dedicated to the 
PIMS context. This paradigm allows each user to physically visualize the net effects of 
sharing rules on her PIMS and automatically provides tangible guarantees about the 
enforcement of the defined sharing policies. Finally, we demonstrate the practicality of the 
approach through a performance evaluation conducted on a real PIMS platform. 
 
Keywords: Personal Information Management Systems (PIMS), Privacy-by-Design, Access 
control, data security 
1. Introduction 
We are witnessing an exponential accumulation of personal data on central servers, gathered 
by administrations and companies, or created by individuals and replicated in the cloud for 
convenience. Centralization exacerbates the risk of privacy leakage due to piracy1, 
scrutinization and opaque business practices. Today, a rebalancing of personal data 
management is occurring worldwide. Smart disclosure initiatives are pushed by legislators 
(e.g., EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [18]) and industry-led consortiums 
(e.g., blue button for medical records and green button for electricity in the US, Midata in the 
UK, MesInfos in France). Smart disclosure enables individuals to get back their personal data 
from companies or administrations that collected them. Concurrently, the Personal 
Information Management System (PIMS) paradigm has been conceptualized [1], [4], and 
emerges in the commercial sphere (e.g., Cozy Cloud, ownCloud, SeaFile). PIMS holds the 
promise of a Privacy-by-Design storage and computing platform where each individual can 
gather her complete digital environment in one place and share it with applications and users 
under her control.  
                                                     
1 Yahoo recent hack attack is emblematic from this phenomenon, as mentioned in "Yahoo state hackers stole data 
from 500 million users" - BBC News. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-37447016 
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But this gravity shift of data management from organizations to individuals raises new 
fundamental issues. Empowering citizens to leverage their personal data leaves the privacy 
and security issues in user's hands, a paradox if we consider the weaknesses of individuals’ 
defenses in terms of computer security and ability to administer sharing policies. Existing 
sharing models (e.g., DAC, RBAC, MAC [7]) are geared towards central authorities and their 
secure enforcement requires a deep expertise, out of reach of individuals. Conversely, 
decentralized tools (e.g., PGP, Web of Trust models [24] or Friend of a Friend (FOAF) 
dissemination rules [8]) put on individuals the burden of defining manually each basic sharing 
rule and leave them on their own to manage error-prone cryptographic protection against 
piracy. Hence, without appropriate answers, the risk is high to see individuals delegate the 
administration of their PIMS to centralized service providers. The circle would come back 
around, with service providers now in possession of the complete individual's digital history. 
The objective of this paper is precisely to address this issue. We do not suggest yet 
another access control model. Rather, we propose a generic paradigm contributing to the call 
for Privacy-by-Design principle when designing any PIMS platform. More precisely, this 
paper makes the following contributions: 
− It proposes a new paradigm called SWYSWYK (Share What You See with Who You 
Know) helping the PIMS owner to visually check and sanitize the net effect of a sharing 
policy over her data, whatever the access control model used to generate this policy. 
− It defines a reference architecture supporting the SWYSWYK paradigm which 
provides to the PIMS owner tangible guarantees about the enforcement of this policy.  
− It conducts a thorough performance evaluation over an instance of this reference 
architecture, combining an existing PIMS platform with a tamper resistant hardware 
device to demonstrate the practicality of the approach.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related works and derives 
from them a precise problem statement. Sections 3, 4 and 5 are respectively devoted to the 
three aforementioned contributions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
2. Related work and problem formulation 
2.1. Access Control and sharing models 
To avoid any confusion between users, let us call owner, the owner of a PIMS and subjects, 
the users the PIMS owner wants to interact and exchange data with. Access control models 
like DAC, RBAC, MAC, ABAC or TBAC [7] are widely supported in the centralized 
database context. They unfortunately share the following characteristics: (1) the access 
control administration is a complex and critical task usually handled by security experts; (2) 
the applicative logic, the users and their roles are identified at an early stage of the 
information system design, so that the access control policy is part of the database schema 
definition. This makes these models badly adapted to a personal usage in the PIMS context, 
except if the PIMS comes with predefined policies that the PIMS owner simply accepts or 
denies. In the latter case, this contradicts user's empowerment, a foundational principle of 
Cavoukian's Privacy-by-Design principles [9] and of the new GDPR regulation [18].   
Conversely, flexible sharing models have been designed to cope with the decentralized 
nature of the Web. In this respect, they seem better adapted to the PIMS context. For instance,  
Web of Trust-like models allow subjects to authenticate thanks to their public key and are 
identified through public profiles [21], to which access rights are associated and defined by 
the owner. However, it requires the owner to manually assign the authorizations, for each 
subject and for each object, which can quickly become tedious and error-prone. To ease data 
sharing administration, [16] implements a distributed tag-based file-system where an owner 
can grant access to her tagged files using a logic-based access control. [12] defines an SQL-
based language to let applications create queryable views on the shared data and transmit 
capabilities to granted subjects. In [8], subjects are granted access depending on their FOAF 
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relationship properties, such as type, graph depth and a computed trust value. Despite all these 
efforts, the cognitive load on the owner is such that it often leads to consider data sharing as 
an intractable burden, letting desperate owners define far too permissive policies [15]. 
2.2. Data security and data sharing enforcement   
A corollary of data sharing definition is the enforcement of the corresponding policies (i.e., 
data to be exchanged) as well as the protection of the PIMS itself (i.e., data at rest) against 
confidentiality attacks. The way PIMS can be secured depends on the data hosting model. 
Traditional solutions (e.g., Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive, Apple iCloud) delegate all the 
control to cloud providers, thereby definitely hurting user's empowerment. [2], [20], [22] 
focus on data encryption in untrusted clouds, while [6] presents a decentralized alternative to 
social networks using Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). [13], [23] use obfuscation schemes, 
where data is substituted for the former and scrambled for the latter. Sharing policies are 
implemented here by means of encryption but, this requires the owner to manually define who 
can access which data on a case-by-case basis. Finally, self-hosting solutions (e.g., ownCloud, 
Lima, CloudLocker ...) let owners install their own PIMS at home, under their control. In all 
approaches, either the owner must give up the control over her data or she inherits the task of 
administering and protecting herself her PIMS, a task that she cannot properly assume. 
2.3. Problem formulation 
Hence, data sharing and data security can be tackled in many ways, but none of the previously 
work won the battle for adoption. The difficulty comes from two contradictory facts. On one 
hand, the owner is de facto the PIMS administrator while it is illusory to expect her gaining 
expertise to secure her PIMS against all forms of attacks or to use tricky protocols to 
exchange cryptographic secrets with partners. On the other hand, delegating these tasks to a 
PIMS provider is in frontal opposition with the foundational user's empowerment principle. 
We can derive from this statement two major properties to be met in the quest of a real 
Privacy-by-Design PIMS: 
− Enlighten empowerment: the effects of all owner’s decisions must be perceivable and 
understandable by herself.  In other words, whatever the sharing model used to express 
a sharing policy, the owner may be in capacity to visualize the net effects of these rules 
on her PIMS and to easily sanitize them if required. 
− Tangible enforcement: the logic of the reference monitor enforcing the sharing policy 
must itself be understandable by the owner and the platform implementing this logic 
must be trusted by her. Making the reference monitor logic understandable leads to an 
extreme simplicity, with the side effect to enable running it on a tamper-resistant 
personal device kept in user's hand, thereby reinforcing the trust in the platform. 
3. SWYSWYK paradigm 
3.1. SWYSWYK baseline 
As said above, our objective is not to introduce yet another access control model. Rather, we 
do the assumption that the access control policy is defined by the genuine access control 
model provided by the PIMS platform. Hence, it could be based on any of the model 
mentioned in Section 2.1, with the few restrictions mentioned below.  
First, we do the assumption that the sharing granularity is the document and that every 
shareable document is made viewable by the PIMS owner. In other words, this means that 
there exist a Viewer application trusted by the owner which delivers an interpretable view of 
each type of document to be shared (e.g., potentially transforms a binary format into a text, an 
image, or a graphic). Whether the result of a complex treatment over a set of documents needs 
to be shared (e.g., an unintelligible computation over a set of smart meter measurements), this 
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treatment must output a viewable shared document (e.g., a curve of consumption). Second, 
each subject the owner wants to interact with should correspond to a PIMS viewable 
document as well (e.g., a contact record, a resume, a picture). Third, the access control policy 
is materialized by a set of Access Control List (ACL, also called permissions hereafter) of the 
form < s, d, a >, where s and d respectively refer to a subject and a document stored in the 
PIMS, and a is an action granted to s on d. The PIMS owner may have the ability to check 
these ACLs and freely filter out whose which presumably hurt her privacy. The owner is not 
expected to check all ACLs but simply to validate some suspicious ones detected as such by 
administration tools detailed next. 
Materializing all ACLs, making them viewable by the owner and letting her filter out 
compromising ones give substance to the Share What You See with Who You Know 
(SWYSWYK) principle. This is in frontal opposition with traditional approaches where 
sharing policies are defined by a set of - potentially complex - rules, evaluated on the fly by 
the reference monitor to grant or deny accesses to documents. Indeed, we do not believe that a 
lambda individual can figure out the result of a powerful solver taking as input a set of 
potentially conflicting positive/negative sharing rules. Traditional approaches may actually 
contribute to the opacity of the PIMS access control management, hurt user's empowerment 
and lead to an opposite effect of that expected, that is defining too permissive policies or 
delegating the control to a third party.  Conversely, the trust assumption made in SWYSWYK 
can be summarized by the following motto: do not blindly trust sharing rules but trust your 
reference monitor to let you examine and adjust the produced permissions and enforce data 
dissemination accordingly. Hence, in contrast to rule-based reference monitors, the logic of a 
SWYSWYK reference monitor can be trivially understood by anyone, that is to say operation 
a on d is granted to s iff (s,d,a)∈ ACL. This logic contributes itself to the enlighten 
empowerment property. Note that adding such user's validation and sanitization process does 
not compromise the soundness of the genuine PIMS sharing model. Indeed, the model 
remains consistent by construction (the decision is unique), complete (the decision always 
exists) and can finally be evaluated in logarithmic time over the sanitized materialized set of 
ACLs. 
The tricky point of the SWYSWYK paradigm lies in the detection and validation of 
suspicious ACLs. The global ACL validation process works as follows. First, the genuine 
sharing policy is translated into a materialized set of candidate ACL named ACL*. Second, 
suspicious ACLs are detected and put in quarantine, in a set named ACL?,  waiting for the 
decision of the PIMS owner. Non suspicious ACLs are directly integrated in the set ACL+, the 
unique set to be considered by the reference monitor to grant or deny accesses to documents. 
Third, the PIMS owner sanitizes the set of suspicious ACLs on a case-by-case basis. She 
visualizes the net effect of suspicious ACLs in ACL? and decides either to store them in ACL+ 
if she considers them innocuous or in ACL− otherwise. The objective of materializing ACL− is 
nothing but avoiding storing in ACL? ACLs for which a negative decision has already been 
made in the past, hence avoiding unnecessary PIMS owner intervention. 
We propose two mechanisms to automatically detect suspicious ACLs and feed ACL? 
from the content of ACL*. The first mechanism is based on an Advisor process identifying 
elements of ACL* which are contradictory to past decisions (i.e., similar to ACLs previously 
classified in ACL−). This mechanism is based on the assumption that owners exhibit a rather 
stable data disclosure behavior over time, as already demonstrated with the usage of emails 
[19]. The second mechanism is user-defined triggers highlighting ACLs for which special 
care should be taken, because of the sensitiveness attached to the documents and/or to the 
subjects involved in these ACLs. These two complementary mechanisms are detailed below.  
3.2. Suspicion based on past decisions 
Given any candidate ACL (s,d,a) ∈ ACL*, the goal is to suggest a decision (i.e., accept or 
suspect) to the owner. We denote by r(s,d,a) this decision. The decision being unique by 
construction, (s,d,a) is discarded if it already exists in ACL+ or ACL−. Otherwise, the Advisor 
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process computes a distance between the candidate ACL (s,d,a) and the ACLs resolved in the 
past (i.e., elements of ACL+ or ACL−) and make a decision similar to the closest resolved ACL 
if the corresponding distance is below a given threshold. 
The way distances are computed is an interesting open issue, which can integrate a 
comparison between attributes of documents and subjects as well as a comparison of histories 
of past decisions. Finding the best metric to compute this distance is let for future work. We 
simply validate the idea thanks to a basic metric, the benefit of which being to be computable 
in any resource constrained secure execution environment (e.g., secure chips).  
Let S be the set of all subjects identified in the owner's PIMS and S'⊆ S  be the set of all 
subjects s' different from s with a resolved decision concerning d and a, that is S'={s'∈S, s'≠s, 
∃(s',d,a) ∈ ACL+ ∪ ACL−}. Let hs (resp. hs') denote the history of all resolved decisions 
regarding s (resp. s'), that is hs={(s,d,a,r(s,d,a)), ∃(s,d,a) ∈ ACL+ ∪ ACL−}. The Resolve(s,d,a) 
algorithm presented below returns a value for r(s,d,a) based on the computation of a distance 
Dist(hs', hs) between hs and all hs' and a confidence level for that value which helps the owner 
making her final decision. This algorithm is based on the assumption that, if s and s' share 
strong similarities in their sharing history with the owner, a past decision taken on (d,a) for s' 
is likely to apply for s as well. Hence, if Resolve suggests 'Accept', there is no reasonable 
reason to doubt the genuine sharing decision and the related ACL is stored in ACL+. 
Otherwise, it falls in quarantine in ACL?. A symmetric algorithm could be based on the 
assumption that, if d and d' share strong similarities in their sharing history by the owner, a 
past decision taken on (s,a) for d' is likely to apply for d. The adaptation of the algorithm 
below to this new assumption is direct. 
 
 
Algorithm 1. Resolve 
Input:   t = <s,d,a> ∈ ACL*  
Output: (r, p) with r a binary decision (Accept or Suspect) 
       and p ∈ [0,1] the confidence in that decision. 
1. if t ∈ ACL+ return ('Accept', 1); 
2. if t ∈ ACL− return ('Suspect', 1); 
3. /* build hs the history of decisions for subject s*/ 
hs = { (acl, 'Accept'), acl.s=t.s, acl ∈ ACL+ }  
  ∪ { (acl, 'Except'), acl.s=t.s, acl ∈ ACL− };  
4. /* build H, the set of histories of other subjects than s with 
decision a for document d */ 
5. H={hs', s'≠s, ∃ acl∈ hs', acl.d = t.d, acl.a = t.a }; 
6. hclose ← the history with smallest Dist(hs, hs'), ∀ hs'∈H ; 
7. r  ← the decision for (d,a) in hclose; 
8. p  ← 1- Dist(h, hclose) ; 
9. return (r, p); 
 
 
The algorithm accuracy improves over time and helps the owner with no required action from 
her. However, it is not efficient at the system initialization. Furthermore, the owner might 
want a more declarative and tunable tool. This is detailed in the next section. 
3.3. Suspicion based on sensitiveness 
An ACL can be considered suspicious either because it involves a sensitive subject (e.g., my 
manager), a sensitive document (e.g., a compromising picture or a part of my medical folder) 
or because the association between a particular subject and document may itself be 
compromising (e.g., I'm not ready to share all my holiday pictures with my colleagues, even if 
I trust them and if most of these pictures are not sensitive). The sensitiveness of subjects, 
documents and associations is left to the PIMS owner appreciation. We provide watchdog 
triggers, which can be specified by the owner, to easily identify ACLs targeting sensitive 
subjects, sensitive objects or sensitive associations between them. To this end, we make the 
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usual assumption that PIMS documents are linked to metadata (e.g., doctype, date, author, 
owner-defined tags, etc) and that metadata can be queried by a predicate-based language. Let 
QE(S) denote the queries expressed over - metadata linked to - documents describing subjects 
and QE(D) denote queries over - metadata linked to - shared documents, with E the predicate 
expression of the query. We propose three types of predefined watchdog triggers: 
− What'sNewforS(E,A) → {(s,{(d,a)}) / (s,d,a)∈ACL* ∧ s∈QE(S) ∧ a=A}: identifies, for 
each selected (sensitive) subject, the new set of action a they are granted to perform on 
which documents d (e.g., "which new documents can be seen by my manager?"). 
− Who'sNewforD(E,A) → {(d,{(s,a)}) / (s,d,a)∈ACL? ∧ d∈QE(D) ∧ a=A}: identifies, for 
each selected (sensitive) document d, the new set of subjects s that are granted to 
perform action a on them (e.g., "which new subjects have a read access to my medical 
records?").  
− WhichNewSD(E,E',A) → {(s,d,a) / (s,d,a)∈ACL* ∧ s∈QE(S) ∧ d∈QE'(D) ∧ a=A}: 
identifies new ACLs combining a selection of (sensitive) subjects and documents (e.g., 
"which new authorizations my colleagues have on my family photos?"). 
4. SWYSWYK reference architecture 
This section introduces a reference architecture implementing the SWYSWYK paradigm 
while providing the tangible enforcement property, thereby making the contribution complete. 
The objective of this architecture is to protect the owner's data by construction, without 
requiring any action from the owner, apart from the validation of suspicious ACLs. Back to 
Cavoukian's Privacy-by-Design principles [9], this means contributing to the Privacy-by-
Default and End-to-End security principles. This architecture, presented in Figure 1, 
distinguishes three main parts with different assumptions in terms of trustworthiness: (i) an 
untrusted environment (UE) on which no security assumption is made for the code nor for the 
data, (ii) an isolated environment (IE) on which general purpose code can be run with the 
guarantee that it cannot leak any information but with no guarantee about the soundness and 
honesty of its output (i.e., code can be corrupted) and (iii) a Secure Execution Environment 
(SEE) which runs only certified core programs and protects data and code against snooping 
and tampering. We postpone to Section 5 concrete illustrations of UE, IE and SEE 
environments, considering here these security assumptions as given. That said, the 
components of the architecture are as follows. 
PIMS data system. Our objective is to adapt to any existing PIMS platform. Thus, no 
assumption can be made on the intrinsic security of such platform. It is then part of the 
untrusted environment UE. All documents of the PIMS need then be stored encrypted in this 
area to protect them against confidentiality attacks. 
 
 
Fig. 1. SWYSWYK Reference Architecture 
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Allowed (s,d,a) 
Secure Execution Env. (SEE) 






















Reference monitor. The reference monitor is part of the secure core of the architecture. It 
must be embedded into the SEE to guarantee that it cannot be bypassed, observed nor 
corrupted by any external application. Roughly speaking, the reference monitor evaluates 
Allowed(s,d,a) requests and delivers true iff (< s, d, a > ∈ ACL+) and  false otherwise. It acts 
as an incorruptible doorkeeper for the whole PIMS data system. Whenever Allowed(s,d,a) is 
evaluated to true, document d is decrypted in the SEE before being delivered to subject s. 
Given the simplicity of the allowed function, it can be hosted in many kinds of (tamper-
resistant) SEE kept in user's hand (e.g., SIM cards in users' smartphones, or secure personal 
tokens [5]).  
Policy translator. The policy translator is in charge of running the rules of the genuine 
sharing policy over the PIMS documents and of materializing candidate ACLs in ACL*. The 
policy translator must run in the isolated environment IE. Indeed, it cannot be part of the UE 
because some sharing rules may depend on the documents content and then require to decrypt 
these documents. It cannot be part of SEE either without hurting the genericity requirement. 
Indeed, the complexity of the policy translator is linked to the expressive power of the 
genuine sharing model and running complex code in a SEE can be highly challenging. Note 
that running the policy translator in IE does not compromise security since no data can leak 
from IE by construction. This property is guaranteed by running each code in IE in an isolated 
container2 with restricted permissions. Typically, the policy translator runs inside a container 
with read access to the PIMS documents, write access to ACL* in SEE and no additional 
privilege (typically, no network access). Hence, the policy translator cannot leak anything and 
cannot be observed by concurrent processes (by definition of an isolated container). 
 Administration console. The administration console is used to help the PIMS owner to 
perform the ACL validation task. As detailed in Section 3, this console runs the Advisor 
process and watchdog triggers over ACL* and puts suspicious ACLs in quarantine in ACL?. 
The administration console must be trusted, but cannot be entirely executed inside the SEE. 
Indeed, it involves interactions with the owner through a GUI and requires displaying the 
content of documents and subjects. Thus, the Administration GUI and document and subject 
viewers must run in isolated containers in IE to prevent any information leakage.  
Internal data structures. The ACL*, ACL?, ACL+ and ACL− sets and the document 
metadata must all be stored inside SEE for obvious security reasons. Storing them in UE 
would incur prohibitive decryption and integrity checking costs during the evaluation of 
Allowed, Advisor and watchdog triggers. However, the counterpart of the reference monitor 
simplicity is the potential cost of evaluating Allowed(s,d,a) in the case of extremely large 
ACL+. This situation may happen whenever a rule of the genuine sharing policy associates a 
large set of subjects with a large set of documents. If storing millions of ACLs and indexing 
them on both s and d is not a challenge in a standard setting, it may become intractable in 
more constrained secure hardware environments (e.g., smartcards, TPM, quantified-self 
devices, smart watches). Such combinatorial explosion can be easily avoided thanks to a 
compact representation. Each ACL set actually materializes a bipartite graph G = (S, D, A) 
where the sets of vertices S and D respectively represent the set of subjects and documents 
and the edges A represent the authorizations linking them. Each sharing rule R defines a 
complete bipartite subgraph GR of G. As such, each GR can be stored in a compressed form as 
a set SR⊆S of subject vertices and a set DR⊆D of document vertices, AR being implicit.  
5. SWYSWYK validation 
We validate the proposed solution on a concrete instance of the reference architecture 
introduced in Section 4, generic enough to draw conclusions for other potential targeted 
instances. We show its efficiency both qualitatively and quantitatively on real and synthetic 
datasets. 
                                                     
2 In practice, isolated containers can be implemented using a dedicated hardware platform, an hypervisor, or a 
microkernel.  
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5.1. Experimental Platform 
The experimental platform used to validate our proposal is based on a combination of the 
Cozy system3 and PlugDB4. Cozy is a representative open-source PIMS suite, gathering 
personal data from multiple sources and organizing it in a document style database (using 
CouchDB5). Our solution is actually independent of the PIMS platform and other PIMS could 
have been used as well (e.g., ownCloud, Sandstorm, Databox [17], etc). PlugDB is a secure 
and open hardware/software platform. It combines a smartcard to store cryptographic secrets, 
a microcontroller (MCU) running a relational database engine queried in SQL which can 
efficiently manage a large database, and a microSD flash card storing the database with 
crypto-protection against snooping and tampering. We used a simple genuine sharing model, 
able to share a selection of documents with a selection of subjects (e.g., “share the Holidays 
photo album with my family group”), where rules are produced by Cozy apps and evaluated 
in the policy translator.  
This experimental platform, presented in Figure 2, is an instance of the reference 
architecture: (i) Cozy runs on a personal computer linked to the network (Internet access) and 
5.2.represents the untrusted environment (UE); (ii) the policy translator, the administration 
GUI and the viewers are installed on a Raspberry Pi without any network connection which 
represents the isolated environment (IE); and (iii) the reference monitor, the Advisor and the 
watchdog triggers are installed within PlugDB, which represents the SEE and communicates 
with both the personal computer (in WiFi IEEE 802.11n) and the Raspberry Pi (in High Speed 
USB 2.0). Validating the approach in such highly constrained environment is a proof of its 
simplicity and of the possibility to formally prove its code. It also demonstrates the ability to 
embed a SWYSWYK engine in any kind of constrained SEE, including IoT objects. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Experiment platform: soft (left) & hard (right). 
In this platform, the isolation property is "physically" guaranteed by the Raspberry Pi, 
such that its enforcement cannot be questioned. Others target architectures can be envisioned. 
For example, a certified hypervisor running on top of Intel SGX on the personal computer 
itself can provide a logical implementation of IE (Figure 3, left part). Smart devices equipped 
with a SIM card, a flash memory card and an ARM Trustzone processor - as many 
smartphones and tablets today - are other options (Figure 3, right part). The major difference 
between these alternatives is on the way UE, IE and SEE communicate. In this section, we 
measure and isolate the communication cost to allow drawing general conclusions. 
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In our experimentations, the personal device implementing UE has a 3GHz Intel Xeon 
E5-1660 CPU, 8 GB of RAM and a 500 GB 10.000 RPM hard drive. The SEE uses a 
STM32F417GH6 MCU, which embeds a 168 MHz ARM Cortex M4 CPU, 192 KB of RAM 
and 1 MB of NOR storage. The IE is a Raspberry Pi 3 with a 1.2GHz ARMv8 CPU and 1 GB 
of RAM. We use an external UHS-I microSD card of 16 GB for both SEE and IE. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Other examples of targeted architectures. 
5.3. Environmental Costs 
We first measure the environmental cost when inserting a new document in the PIMS. Figure 
4 pictures the four components of this cost: (1) transfer costs (WiFi) of the document between 
UE and SEE (in cleartext from UE to SEE and in encrypted form back), (2) document 
encryption cost by SEE, (3) insertion of the encrypted document into the Cozy system and (4) 
transfer cost (USB) of the cleartext document from SEE to IE (where the policy translator 
checks whether this document matches some sharing rules and sends back ACLs in the 
positive case). Note that step 4 can be performed in parallel with the first three steps, 
explaining why we isolate its cost (USB transfer) in the figure.  
 
  
Fig. 4. Environmental costs for one document. Fig. 5. Execution time of Allowed in SEE. 
The environmental costs are negligible for small size documents, whereas the WiFi 
transfer dominates for large documents. Note that the communication costs could be 
significantly improved by using newer WiFi and USB norms (WiFi 802.11ac and USB 3.1 
offer data rates theoretically 2.9 and 20.8 times faster than 802.11n and USB 2.0, 
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implemented rather than being linked to the SWYSWYK model on its own. Hence, 
alternative architectures such as those pictured in Figure 3 would greatly reduce these costs.  
5.4. Reference Monitor cost 
The Allowed function takes as input a triple (s, d, a) and returns true if subject s is granted 
authorization a on document d and false otherwise. As explained in Section 4, executing this 
function sums up to check the existence of the triplet (s, d, a) in ACL+ which is represented in 
a compact way by a complete bipartite graph for each rule. This leads to store the ACLs in 
relational tables of the form Rule(RuleId, A), NodeS(RuleId, SubjectId), NodeD(RuleId, 
DocId), so that Allowed is a simple SQL query on these tables. Selection indexes have been 
built in PlugDB to speed up this query. 
Figure 5 gives the execution time of Allowed, increasing the number of ACLs up to 1 
million. The figure shows that the performance of Allowed remains acceptable (i.e., below 
one second) in all cases up to 1 million of ACLs, while such a case is very unlikely. This 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach. 
5.5. Qualitative analysis of ACL validation 
We evaluate here the quality of the Resolve function by applying it on a real dataset. As we 
are not aware of any public ACL dataset, we chose personal emails datasets for this 
qualitative analysis. Indeed, famous email datasets have been made available to the 
community and emails reflect in some respect the policy of a user in terms of personal 
documents dissemination (and of other types of data sharing scenarios [19]). For the sake of 
representativeness, we use four different real datasets: the ENRON dataset [11], the Hillary 
Clinton’s emails revealed by Wikileaks [14] and the emails of one author of this paper (called 
people1) and of one of his family member (called people2).  
In this experiment, we consider the email body as a personal document di granted by the 
sender to the set of recipients {sj}. ACL+ is then given by the set {(sj, di, 'read')}. To generate 
ACL*, we randomly choose some 'legitimate' (i.e., existing) elements in ACL+ and some 
'illegitimate' elements built by combining existing emails d in {di} with existing recipients s in 
{sj} which are not recipients of d. We expect the Resolve function to accept the legitimate 


































































































The function that we use to evaluate the distance between the histories of two subjects 
sums up to count the number of emails where the two subjects appear as recipients, and apply 
the reciprocal function. Such a simple Dist function can be easily implemented in SQL on top 
of PlugDB by using a count query. The evaluation shows that such a simple function makes 
sense and allows to get a Resolve implementation close to Algorithm 1. For each element (di, 
sj) of ACL*, we compute the distance between sj and all the others recipients of this email (i.e., 
the subjects who are granted access to di in ACL+) and keep the subject with the smallest 
distance. If the distance is below a minimum threshold t, Resolve accepts the ACL and puts it 
in ACL+ , or puts it in quarantine in ACL? otherwise.  
In Figures 6, we generate 50 elements in ACL* half of which being legitimate. The 
process was repeated 1.000 times and the figures plot the mean of all the runs. The results are 
provided for each dataset, varying the distance threshold t. The lower t, the closer an element 
of ACL* needs to be from an element of ACL+ to be suggested by Resolve as Accept. This 
explains the respective shapes of the curves Accept and Suspect which plot the success rate of 
an ACL? to be correctly categorized into ACL+ or ACL?. The optimal value for t corresponds 
to the crossing point of both curves, where the success rate is around 80% for both Accept and 
Suspect classification. Optimal t depends on each user behavior, calling for a training process. 
Typically, optimal t for Clinton is high because Clinton address book is extremely large, 
resulting in a wide dispersion in the recipient distribution. Conversely, People1 is more 
intimate in his behavior leading to a high concentration of the recipients. To further improve 
the success rate, others variables could be integrated in the decision process, such as the 
recency of the history entries [19] or their semantic proximity. Anyway, this evaluation shows 
that even a simple decision process makes sense and is compatible with a highly constrained 
secure execution environment. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper introduces a Privacy-by-Design sharing paradigm, called SWYSWYK (Share 
What You See with Who You Know), dedicated to the PIMS context. This paradigm allows 
each owner to visualize the net effects of sharing rules on her PIMS and to easily sanitize the 
sharing policy. Moreover, it provides tangible guarantees about the enforcement of the 
sanitized sharing policies without user intervention. Finally, we have shown the effectiveness 
of the approach through a performance evaluation performed on a secure DB engine 
(PlugDB) linked to an existing PIMS platform (Cozy).  
Many exciting open issues remains to be investigated. A first perspective is linked to the 
security analysis of SWYSWYK which should be conducted for other architectures, e.g., 
based on processors like [3], [10] offering new forms of secure and isolated execution 
environments. A second important issue is the definition of more powerful tools helping the 
owner to detect suspicious ACLs.   While the PIMS paradigm is pushed by recent legislation 
and smart disclosure initiatives, finding new ways to intuitively and securely share personal 
data is paramount. Otherwise, the risk is high to see desperate individuals delegate the 
administration of their PIMS to centralized service providers, a heresy in a period where 
stronger user's empowerment is called for. We hope that this work actively contributes to this 
challenge.  
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